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🇦🇺 Latitude Financial will not pay a ransom to those behind a cyber attack. Latitude Financial Services could face a class action lawsuit from some of the 14 million customers who have had their personal information exposed

abc.net.au/news/2023-04-11/lat

🇪🇸 La Autoridad Catalana de Protección de Datos ha recibido y tramitado un total de 150 notificaciones de organizaciones y entidades que han sufrido violaciones de seguridad de datos personales

apdcat.gencat.cat/ca/sala_de_p

🇨🇦 Suite à l'annonce d'une série de mesures visant à soutenir 🇺🇦 l'Ukraine, une vague d'attaques en déni de service distribué revendique par 🇷🇺 NoName a perturbé l'accès à certains sites web dont celui du premier ministre (pm.gc.ca), le port de Québec (portquebec.ca) et celui d'Halifax (portofhalifax.ca)

ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1

A better way to attack Microsoft Azure AD with temporary access passes

Microsoft's TAPs were designed to simplify passwordless authentication, but they can also be used by attackers to bypass MFA.

Even if an administrator goes in and deletes the TAP, an attacker could still maintain access to the user account. In the process of the OAuth On-Behalf-Of (OBO) flow, we have somehow removed the correlation between the Temporary Access Passes (TAP) and the refresh token, a process I (Daniel Heinsen, SpecterOps) am calling « OBO persistence ».

Granted, in this scenario, you only have access to APIs that don't require admin consent, but that's enough to read the users email, Teams messages, OneNote notes, and calendar. In order to revoke this access, an administrator will need to revoke all the user refresh tokens.

posts.specterops.io/id-tap-tha

🛠 obo-wash

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