bianca maria @gicat@nanao.cybtex.fr

La guerre de haute intensité est plus que jamais une réalité. Les ambitions de demain se fondent sur le quantique. Ainsi, se dessine un futur, où ces deux innovations convergeront lors de campagnes militaires.

https://portail-ie.fr/analysis/4162/guerre-du-futur-la-strategie-nucleaire-a-lheure-du-quantique

For several months, the U.S Army has quietly been experimenting with how to link its Special Operations Command, its Space and Missile Defense Command and its Cyber Command more closely on the battlefield, under a new « triad » concept.

All data will be used to bolster the service's capability to monitor or deter an adversary.

Operations included lethal options in the physical world paired with non-lethal options, such as information warfare or cyber.

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/army-cyber-space-and-special-operations-commands-integrating-under-new-triad-concept/

The Cyber Military Intelligence Group was created to perform functions not found anywhere else within the Army or intel community, and blend open source information with military intelligence.

Big data platforms exist across U.S. Cyber Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency, Army Cyber Command and the Marine Corps. They are essentially hybrid cloud environments that allow for storage, computation and analytics across networked sensors. When forces conduct cyber missions, they collect data and use high-powered analytics to make sense of it. Big data platforms do just that, but also share that analysis in an easy-to-access repository for other forces. The Army's version is called Gabriel Nimbus.

https://www.fedscoop.com/new-army-intel-unit-having-big-impact-on-recently-established-triad/

The Army will be building two more cyber mission force teams for U.S. Cyber Command. The majority of new cyber mission force teams will come from the Army and Air Force. Teams will learn foundational concepts of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum and could serve in new tactical electronic warfare units or in integrated cyber, electronic warfare and information operations units, as well as staff sections.

Offensive cyber forces conduct operations under what's known as Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber, which provide planning, targeting, intelligence and cyber capabilities.

https://www.fedscoop.com/army-adding-more-cyber-teams/

#usa #government #military #defense #cyber #networks #research #electronic #kinetic #electromagnetic #offensive #intelligence #experimental #warfare #services #bigdata #sensors #triad #weapons #strategy #cyberspace #technologies #cloud #data #threats #informatique

🇺🇸 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

#government #fiscal #military #budget #threats #defense

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY2023%20NDAA%20Executive%20Summary.pdf

The U.S Army intends to double the size of its active-duty cyber corps by the end of the decade, including boosting its electronic warfare capacity.

#usa #government #military #defense #cyber #research #disruptive #kinetic #weapons #offensive #warfare #strategy #industrial #technologies #threats #informatique

https://www.fedscoop.com/army-to-double-size-of-active-duty-cyber-corps/

The U.S Army is finalizing doctrine setting in place the notion of information advantage.

The concept has 5 main pillars:

• enable decision-making,
• protect friendly information,
• inform and educate domestic audiences,
• inform and influence international audiences,
• conduct information warfare.

#usa #government #military #doctrine #cyber #defense #technologies #lid #lio #data #internet #research #strategy #informatique

https://www.fedscoop.com/fusing-open-source-and-military-intelligence-is-next-big-step-in-armys-transition-to-information-advantage/

🇺🇸 Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/peters-and-portman-introduce-landmark-legislative-package-to-strengthen-public-and-private-sector-cybersecurity-

More Americans have died of the novel coronavirus than in every conflict the U.S

COVID-19 was the most obvious precursor of the new MAD ( Massive Attacks of Disruption )

Beyond COVID-19 and state and non-state actors, 7 major disruptors can be identified.

The first is failed and failing governments. The other disruptors are climate change, cyber, social media, terrorism, debt and drones.

#government #cyber #climate #kinetic #drones #disruptive #threats #industrial #military #defense #hardware #business #technologies #data #internet #research #software #informatique #covid19 #usa #coronavirus

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/1/5/the-new-more-dangerous-massive-attacks-of-disruption

The Department of Defense's National Defense Strategy, to be published in early 2022, is one of the most important documents the Biden administration will produce.

• U.S must build the force to dominate armed conflict of the future.
• U.S must rebalance its force posture from Central Command-centric to a more globally oriented model.
• U.S needs to compete now and engage in offensive hybrid warfare actions.
• Future warfighting must be joint, combined, and across all domains.

#defense #strategy #cyber #usa #terrorism #warfare #industrial #military #hybrid #war #threats #technologies #research #government

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Seizing-the-Advantage_A-Vision-for-the-Next-US-National-Defense-Strategy.pdf

• VigiNum is dedicated to the detection and characterization of foreign media manipulation.

French gov. allocated to VigiNum an annual budget of 12 million euros, and an in-house expert workforce of 65, mostly comprising data scientists, social media analysts and a few geopolitics experts. Overall, almost a hundred people will contribute to VigiNum's missions, with the help of other ministries. The service will be led by a magistrate with experience in counterterrorism coordination, which indicates that it will act primarily as an interministerial coordination tool.

This model is reminiscent of the U.S.'s Global Engagement Center and of the U.K.'s National Security Communications Team.

France has long conducted psychological operations (PsyOps), and much of the doctrine's content was not a secret for well-informed readers.

When countering disinformation, the French government faces the same questions at home and abroad: where to draw the line and, most importantly, how to walk it.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/france-doubles-down-countering-foreign-interference-ahead-key-elections-0

The first U.S. National Cyber Director wants the government to take a tougher, more #proactive approach to those who threaten America's networks: degrade their capabilities and demonstrate how they would suffer should they attack.

Inglis didn't say exactly how that degradation of adversarial ransomware and hacking capabilities was « underway » but did say that, like any strategy, this one will take time and persistent implementation before it yields victory.

#cyber #defense #strategy

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/10/new-white-house-cyber-director-wants-fight-cobra-kai/186501/

🇫🇷 Doctrine #militaire de lutte #informatique d'influence

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrVdRHkwmsk

#france #doctrine #cyber #militarisation #lid #lio